At 27 minutes past 2 on a Monday afternoon, the phone on my desk rang. Picking it up I was greeted by Faye Langford (a name I was unfamiliar with) asking if she could speak to the company’s CEO, Robert Rutherford. She said she was calling from one of our suppliers (which has been left intentionally unnamed) about an earlier email regarding problems with a credit card.
As Rob was out of the office, I asked if there was anyone else who could help. I was informed that Rob was the only person on the account and so I told Faye that I would pass on the message. She wished me a good day and that was the end of our conversation.
I emailed Rob the details of the call and was content that the issue would be resolved now it was in the appropriate hands.
This all seemed quite ordinary but here are two things which change that:
- There are two people at this supplier who would normally call us regarding card information. Faye Langford is not one of them.
- There are over 15,000 employees who work at this supplier. Faye Langford is not one of them.
So, what had just happened?
What had happened was an attempt at voice phishing – also known as vishing. When you think of phishing, you probably think of emails but unfortunately, phishing can occur on any channel. Phone calls, SMS or social media are all platforms which scammers can use to fraudulently acquire your details.
But there are some things which make this attempt particularly alarming.
- They already knew Rob’s full name and that he was the company’s CEO
- They knew that we use this supplier and are familiar with the name
- They didn’t probe further when asked if there was anyone else at the company they regularly spoke to
While the information in point one is widely available – on LinkedIn and the company website – it serves as a reminder that scammers will use personal details to make their attacks more targeted and realistic. Had Faye asked to speak to “the CEO”, I would have delved much deeper into what the purpose of the call was. But since she was on first-name terms and was purportedly calling from a known supplier I was more inclined to trust her.
The second point is alarming because it’s narrowly accurate. Since the supplier is well known and works with many companies, this may have simply been a fluke. Alternatively, this may be an emerging worst-case scenario. It’s possible that the supplier has at some point suffered a data-breach and had client information leaked. This would explain how they knew we worked with that supplier and may have been the source of Rob’s details as well.
As it turns out, a few days preceding the call from Faye, the supplier had suffered a data breach. This breach included client’s names, job titles, and partial payment information including cardholder name and card type. This makes it hard to doubt the two events are unrelated.
The third and final point is the most alarming whilst also being seemingly insignificant. When Faye called, she wanted to speak with Rob and was clear that no one else could help when told he was unavailable. This indicates that the scam wasn’t just a scattergun approach but targeted at Rob specifically. Considering that cardholder name was part of the data leaked in the breach mentioned previously, this may be why.
How do vishing scams work?
Based on the articles covering the breach, the information given during the call and other attempts we’ve seen before, the scam would have likely gone like this:
The supplier’s data is breached and acquired by cyber-criminals. This may be sold on a dark-web marketplace to the scammer or the scammer might have been the one to directly take the data.
The scammer creates a fake email pretending to be from the supplier and sends it to the target company stating they need to resubmit card details due to ‘an issue’. This email may include a website link or telephone number to ‘update’ the card details – both of which will be fake.
(I should note that we never actually discovered an email. It’s possible that it was blocked by our email security system due to coming from a known malicious address or linking to a known malicious URL. Alternatively, the email may be entirely fabricated and only used to imply there’s ongoing communication and build trust in the call.)
The scammer now calls the organisation and requests to speak to the target regarding the email about card information. Once they reach the intended target they would likely say that there’s an issue with billing and until the card details are resubmitted, all orders will be frozen and no additional payments can be made.
If the target is worried by this and not suspicious of the request, they will likely be happy to hand over their card details to resolve the issue. The scammer would then check the details are real and maybe say something like “Excellent, I can see the payments are going through now.”, before hanging up.
How can you protect your business from vishing?
Undertake user training
You’ve probably heard this reiterated a hundred times before, but one thing often left unmentioned is that you must ensure your training program is grounded in the scope of the business.
The more abstract training is from employee’s day to day roles, the less engaged they will be and the less they’ll remember. A simulated vishing call against employees whilst in the workplace is not only realistic but will likely leave a lasting impression – making it incredibly valuable.
Don’t rely too heavily on caller ID
Caller ID allows you to put a name to a phone number and identify who’s calling. This sounds like a useful tool in preventing scammers masquerading as someone they’re not. But caller ID can be easily spoofed to show what the scammer wants to show.
There are many online services which offer caller ID spoofing – making it easy for scammers to take advantage of the trust a caller ID can give. This doesn’t mean caller ID is completely useless though as it can be helpful in filtering out nuisance calls, but you should not blindly trust the system.
Don’t respond to requests for details
It’s easy to say this, but if it were easy to do, vishing wouldn’t exist. To keep your details secure, you must get yourself and your employees into the mindset that unless the request is coming from an official channel which the caller can prove is genuine, don’t divulge company details.
Establishing and enforcing acceptable channels of communication for clients can make this much simpler. If you establish in company policy that certain details may never be communicated via certain channels (i.e. never disclose a mobile number over email), it’ll be far easier to stop scammers who are trying to siphon information out of the business.
Take the time to check
If there’s a suspicious call about an urgent bank transfer or new card details, get approval on whether it’s genuine off the phone and ideally face-to-face with who usually deals with the issue (e.g. the finance director). If the caller is genuine, they won’t mind you taking the time to check and if they aren’t, checking is a good way to avoid a disaster.
It’s worth building this approval process into policies so that people know who to go to for each request. Having the process in company policy also shows that asking about the authenticity of a suspicious request isn’t something for employees to be worried about doing.
This policy sounds severe, but zero-trust simply means employees who don’t need to know something, aren’t told it. If you store credit card details in a secure digital wallet which everyone has access to, it only takes one successful vishing call for those details to be compromised.
If only the finance department has access to those details though, it’s much harder for a scammer to get lucky off an unaware employee who was trying to be helpful.
Establish and communicate a list of acceptable requesters
Like with establishing acceptable channels, you should ideally have a list of names for which it is acceptable to give details to. If you’re employing zero-trust, this list only needs to be known amongst those who have access to the details; otherwise, you’ll need to communicate it to the entire company.
… To summarise
Before this experience with vishing, I had only experienced it once before and it had been a rather poor attempt (a very robotic voice asking about the ‘accident’ I had been involved in). I had been fairly certain that this was the way vishing would stay – easy to spot, scattergun and done by text-to-speech. But this latest call has unfortunately proved me wrong.
Not only was it done by an actual real human, but it was pointed at a very specific individual. This is a trend which mirrors the evolution of other cyber-attacks and the increased weight cyber-criminals are placing on social engineering in their toolset. Whilst this threat is old and not uncommon in high-end security breaches, it seems it’s now also coming to the masses.
If you’re uncertain about whether phishing, vishing or any other type of cyber-crime is happening on the scope and scale it’s reported at, I hope this experience opens your eyes to the reality of what’s happening. It certainly did for me.